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Abstract 
 
We study a cap-and-trade market equilibrium where different regions belonging to an emissions trading 
regime have different ambitions about the stringency of the cap. Specifically, we introduce a segment of 
consumers with Kantian preferences and show that they would prefer a more stringent cap compared to 
other regions. When a region sets up a voluntary more stringent cap within a cap-and-trade market, dual 
carbon markets with dual prices on allowances can emerge with trade against both caps. We then show 
that labelling a subset of the allowances in a cap-and-trade market captures the higher willingness to pay 
driven by different ambition levels among agents within a trading scheme. We show under what 
circumstances a socially efficient outcome from carbon markets can be achieved by labelling allowances 
when there are heterogeneous preferences among regions about the ambition level in an emissions trading 
regime. Being voluntary, trade in labelled allowances is consistent with a bottom-up approach where 
efforts are built up gradually by actors, countries and regions that wants to take leadership in international 
climate policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Carbon emissions trading schemes are one of the most important mechanisms in climate policy 
as suggested both in the policy literature and by its increasing use. Understanding carbon trade 
markets in the economic literature has so far been dominated by neoclassical rational choice 
theory as a framework for modeling social and economic behavior in carbon trade markets. 
However, the critique of neoclassical rational choice theory has gained new impetus, not least 
due to new research in behavioral and experimental economics. Many of the critics have focused 
on the apparent difficulty of rational choice theory to account for the role of moral or ethical 
concerns in human decision-making. Climate change, overfishing, deforestation, littering, and 
antibiotic resistance are all examples where moral and ethical concerns matter. Self-interest 
utilitarian (classical) economic theory predicts that individuals (and other actors) will not behave 
in accordance with collective rationality whenever this is in conflict with individual rationality. 
However, this is not what we empirically observe; overall, individuals to some extent do engage 
in cooperative behavior where moral and ethical concerns matter. Also, in managerial and 
political decision-making, many strategies now include sustainability and voluntary compliance 
with national and international sustainability initiatives and standards. Firms today voluntary 
choose to offset their greenhouse gas emissions on a regular basis. We see regions or nations that 
take leadership within international climate policy. Even regions within international emission 
trading schemes want to take leadership, for instance within the EU ETS where United Kingdom 
in 2013 introduced a national price floor on European allowances to underpin the price of carbon 
at a level that drives low carbon investment. Initiatives like these generate questions as to what 
extent self-interest utilitarian (classical) economic theory and individual rationality can predict 
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such decisions, and to what extent regions within in a trading system should implement national 
policy instruments that may counteract the efficiency of the emissions trading system.  
In this paper, we address these questions in a case when Kantian ethics informs individual and 
managerial decision-making in carbon trade markets (Kant, [1785] 1997). We study a cap-and 
trade market equilibrium where different regions belonging to an emissions trading regime have 
different ambitions about the stringency of the cap. We introduce a segment of consumers with 
Kantian preferences in a region and show that they would prefer a more stringent cap compared 
to other regions. When a region sets up a voluntary more stringent cap within the cap-and-trade 
market, dual carbon markets with dual prices on allowances can emerge with trade against both 
caps simultaneously. We then analyze to what extent labelling a subset of the allowances in a 
cap-and-trade market can capture the higher willingness to pay driven by different ambition 
levels among agents within a trading scheme. We show under what circumstances a socially 
efficient outcome from carbon markets can be achieved by labelling allowances. 
 
1.1 Background 
A number of authors have suggested modifications in the self-interest rational choice model. A 
first type of modification is to augment the model with prosocial behavior, such as fairness or 
altruistic preferences (see, e.g., Kahnemann et al. 1996; Andreoni 1990; Andreoni and Payne 
2015), or with context and institutional factors, such as punishment and rewards (see, e.g., Fehr 
and Gächter 2000; Sefton et al. 2007; Sutter et al. 2010), while maintaining the assumption that 
agents maximize outcomes as in the standard theory.  
A second type of modification that has received attention in the economics literature is to 
augment the optimizing behavior (not necessarily modifying preferences), as suggested in Rabin 
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(1995), Sen (2002) and Roemer (2010, 2015). In the words of Sen, for instance, it may imply a 
committed behavior that “arise[s] from self-imposed restrictions on the pursuit of one’s own 
goals (in favor of, say, following particular rules of conduct)” (2002, 214). Rabin (1995) 
suggests a distinction between moral preferences and moral rules. The former describes 
behavior as moral preferences in the utility function, and the latter describes moral behavior as 
voluntary constraints (moral rules) reducing one’s budget constraint—a form of constrained 
optimization. Vanberg (2008) argues that when moral concerns are included as additional 
preferences in an agent’s utility function, one ignores the difference between preferences over 
outcomes and preferences over actions, thus failing to recognize that moral preferences belong in 
the second category. He claims that one cannot, however, account for preferences over actions 
within a standard rational choice theory. Rather, this would require a shift of perspective, from a 
theory of rational choice to a theory of rule-following behavior.  
Roemer (2010, 2015) assumes that individuals’ cooperative behavior can be explained by an 
optimization protocol following the categorical imperative of Kant ([1785] 1997). Roemer 
further proves that a Pareto-efficient equilibrium in tragedy of the commons situations can be 
reached without introducing assumptions about moral preferences, altruism, or other prosocial 
preferences.1 The seminal work by Kant that underlies Roemer (2015) is considered one of the 
most significant texts in the history of ethics. As a deontological theory, Kantian ethics focus on 
the morality of actions rather than consequences as suggested by utilitarianism. Actions can be 
morally required, forbidden, or permitted regardless of the consequences. Belonging to the 
category of deontological theories in which one has a moral obligation to abide by a set of 
defined principles, the Kantian theory differs from utilitarian theories in several ways. Moral 
                                                          
1 A special case of the categorical imperative, as featured by the model in Roemer (2015), was actually applied 
already by Brekke et al. (2003). 
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worth comes only when the agent chooses to do something because it is a duty and the agent 
would choose to do so even if he or she does not like the consequences. An act may be morally 
wrong even if it leads to the greatest happiness or the best outcome. The rightness or wrongness 
of a choice or following a rule is a matter of the preference of that choice or rule, not of its 
consequences. A pure utilitarian approach, on the other hand, holds that the morality of a choice 
is solely a matter of the overall good (e.g., pleasure, happiness, or fulfilling preferences) 
produced by the consequences of a choice or following a moral rule. This distinction is also 
reminiscent of the distinctions between moral preferences and moral rules in Rabin (1995) and 
between preferences over outcomes and preferences over actions in Vanberg (2008).  
In recent decades, the Kantian approach has had a substantial impact on a wide range of theory 
and scholarship in academic, as well as practical, literature on business ethics and managerial 
decision-making (for an overview, see, e.g. Stroud, 2002, Bowie 1999,  L’Etang 1992). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is so far no literature on what the Kantian approach 
would imply for business ethics and agents’ decision-making in carbon trade markets.  
In this paper, we analyze the outcomes when a Kantian approach informs individual and 
managerial decision-making in one region of the emissions trading scheme preferring a more 
stringent cap compared to other regions. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the analysis and the development of our results. Specifically, in section 2.1 we describe Kant’s 
categorical imperative. Section 2.2 derives the moral constraints for consumers with Kantian 
preferences when making consumption decisions which generate greenhouse gas emissions 
levels. In section 2.3, the moral constraints are derived for Kantian agents engaging in carbon 
trade markets. In section 2.4, we model a market equilibrium and analyze welfare and 
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distributional effects in a carbon market with and without labelled allowances. Finally, the paper 
ends with Results and Discussion in section 3. 
 
2. Kantian Ethics and Climate Change 
To derive the principles of the self-imposed moral constraints from the categorical imperative for 
Kantian agents in our model of a compliance carbon market, we first explore the Kantian 
categorical imperative on a voluntary carbon market. Consider the following simple illustration 
of trade in a voluntary carbon market: Suppose that the sustainable level of emissions to avoid 
climate destabilization is 3 tons of carbon per capita. Agent A emits 4 tons and intends to buy 
carbon allowances compensating for the 1 ton exceeding the sustainable level. Agent B offers a 1 
ton allowance by reducing his emissions from 5 to 4 tons. Agent C offers to sell a 1 ton 
allowance by reducing his emissions from 3 to 2 tons. The two trade alternatives for Agent A are 
illustrated in table 1.  
Table 1. Emissions allocations with different trade alternatives 
Trade alternative 
Agent A 
emissions 
after trade 
Agent B 
emissions 
after trade 
Agent C 
emissions 
after trade 
Traders total 
emissions 
after trade 
Total emissions  
after trade 
Agent A–Agent B trade 4 4 3 8 11 
Agent A–Agent C trade 4 5 2 6 11 
 
Does it matter whether Agent A buys the allowances from Agent B or Agent C? When it comes 
to preferences over outcomes in terms of climate impacts (or anyone’s preferences about these 
outcomes), there is no difference between trade with Agent B and trade with Agent C as both 
trade alternatives result in a total of 11 tons . However, from a Kantian approach, we claim that 
there may be a substantial difference between the two trades. If Agent A buys the allowance 
from Agent C, the sum of their emissions per capita is 4 + 2 = 6 tons, which is within the 
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sustainable level of 6 tons in total for the two agents engaging in trade. If Agent A instead buys 
from Agent B, the sum of their emissions levels would be 4 + 4 = 8 tons, which exceeds the 
sustainable level of 6 tons for the two agents. This exchange consists of trade between two 
agents who are both exceeding the sustainable level. If all trade were like theirs, the exchanged 
allowances would be contradictory to the intention to counteract climate change. Specifically, we 
will claim that a Kantian agent will be willing to engage in A–C trade but not A–B trade. 
Existing carbon trade markets then impose transaction costs on Kantian agents, as they need to 
separate the total market supply of allowances into sustainable and unsustainable allowances. 
Under what circumstances can a socially efficient outcome from carbon trade markets be 
achieved under Kantian preferences? 
Kant’s ethics theory proposes a nonconsequential moral theory based on the duty to do the right 
things. To determine whether an action is right, Kant developed the categorical imperative, 
which states, “So act that the maxim of your action could become a universal law” (Sullivan, 
1989, 346). Hence, before an agent makes a decision to act, he or she should ask himself or 
herself whether that action could be raised to universal law as a command for all other rational 
beings to follow. If it can be implemented in this way, it is morally right; if not, it is morally 
wrong.  
Consider one of Kant’s own illustrations of whether making a promise that you do not intend to 
keep is morally right or wrong. You ask a friend to lend you money, knowing that you will not 
be able to pay it back. Would such an action be morally right? According to utilitarianism, the 
answer could ultimately depend on whether the utility that you would have from the money is 
greater or lower than the loss in utility your friend would face. A Kantian test would instead use 
logics and intuitively go as follows: First, describe the act as a maxim, M : “I will borrow money 
8 
without the intention of paying it back in order to get myself out of a bind.” Then follows Kant’s 
categorical imperative (CI), turning M into a universal law, UM : “Everyone must borrow money 
without intending to pay it back in order to get himself out of a bind.” In this example, it leads to 
what in Kantian terms is called a “contradiction in conception.” A system where everyone could 
promise whatever occurred to him or her with the intention of not keeping the promise would 
make the very concept of a promise cease to have credibility. The maxim “borrow money 
without intending to pay it back” cannot be universalized without contradiction and fails the test, 
and consequently, M describes a morally impermissible act. The test can be performed with 
other examples, such as stealing money. In a system where everyone is to steal, the concept of 
property rights does not exist, and the intention and concept of stealing become impossible, since 
stealing presumes the existence of property rights. Hence, such a maxim about stealing money 
would lead to a contradiction in conception and consequently be a morally impermissible act.2  
Kantian tests further identify some permissible acts as duties (obligatory acts) that one is morally 
required to do in certain circumstances. Saving a drowning child, keeping promises, and paying 
back loans are examples that are identified as duties in the test. Technically, a duty is identified 
as the negation of a maxim that fails the Kantian test. “I shall steal money from others” fails the 
test, and therefore the negation of the maxim ( M¬ ), “I shall not steal money from others,” is a 
duty.  
To identify whether an act A is a duty therefore requires two tests. The outcomes from Kantian 
tests are summarized in table 2. If a maxim of A passes test I, then test II is implemented on the 
maxim where the omission of the act ( A¬ ) is tested. If the maxim of A passes the test and the 
                                                          
2 It should be noted that in Kant’s description of contradiction in conception, it is not the consequences (in our 
example, the undermining of human relationships, and anarchy from everyone stealing, and so on) that cause a 
maxim to fail the test, but the logical contradiction in universalizing the intention behind the act. In other words, the 
Kantian test counts intentions behind the acts, while utilitarianism counts consequences of the acts. 
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maxim of A¬  fails the test, then A is identified as a duty, an obligatory act. For example, the act 
of “making a promise with the intention to break it” is morally impermissible. If everyone 
always broke his or her promises, the intention of making and then breaking one’s promise 
becomes impossible, since the concept of a promise does not exist. The intention would self-
defect. On the contrary, if both maxims of A and A¬  pass the test, A is a permissible act, as 
is A¬ . Consequently, a duty must always be a permissible act. If A fails the test, A is 
impermissible. If both A and A¬  fail, the Kantian test is indefinite. An example of the latter 
could be if a person is facing two drowning children and can save only one of them. A maxim 
that one should save child 1 but not child 2 fails, but so does its negation, that one should save 
child 2 but not child 1, and the test is indefinite.3 
Table 2. Kantian Test Outcomes 
Test I Test II Result 
A pass A¬  fail A is a duty 
A pass A¬  pass A is morally permissible 
A fail A¬  pass A is morally impermissible 
A fail A¬  fail Test is indefinite 
 
There is a close logical relationship between Kant’s idea of maxims that can be universalized and 
sustainable actions. According to Kant ([1785] 1997), acts that fail the test are usually also 
discovered as morally impermissible in successful cultures (those that thrive and survive). The 
rational demand for universality implies, according to Kant ([1785] 1997), that we can rationally 
formulate universal categorical imperatives that are derived from our rational nature and apply 
equally to all. Morality is held to apply to all rational agents by virtue of their rationality. In the 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that there are other examples when Kantian tests become indefinite and result in other problems 
with definiteness. This has been extensively analyzed in literature but is beyond the scope of this paper (see e.g. 
Rentmeester, C. 2010, Kant, I. [1785] 1997 and Sullivan 1989). 
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context of climate change, Schönfeld (2007), argue that Kant’s Categorical Imperative 
characterizes the potential of a rule to evolve into a general and naturally self-sustaining schema 
of action, which is also what makes the action right. In other words, sustainable actions are 
morally right simply because they can be universalized, and hence, develop as common norms in 
the society. Unsustainable actions are morally wrong simply because they cannot be 
universalized, and hence, cannot develop as common norms.  
 
2.1 Applying Kantian Ethics to Climate Change  
In this section, we use a Kantian approach to derive the principles of the first moral constraint for 
agents (individuals, organizations, or governments)—namely, how much CO2 to emit (hereafter 
referred to as the agent’s emissions level). We model Kantian agents similarly to the way moral 
rules are modelled in Rabin (1995). In the following sections, we denote such agents as K-
rational to distinguish them from rational agents in standard rational choice theory. K-rational 
means that the agent acts in accordance with Kant’s categorical imperative. However, when the 
categorical imperative does not bind them to follow the Kantian moral law, these agents act 
according to instrumental rationality, which applies to rational choice theory.4  
We assume that the atmosphere, as a sink for CO2 emissions, is a scarce resource and global 
common good. Overusing it will result in detrimental climate change impacts. Furthermore, we 
assume the agent’s emissions level is determined by the consumption level of a composite good.5 
Using Kantian terminology, the morally permissible emissions level is a level that can be 
generalized as a maxim. The Kantian test determines the maximum morally permissible 
                                                          
4 For non-moral issues, Kant denotes hypothetical imperatives (if you want consequences y, do x), which are 
consistent with instrumental rationality. 
5 We will consistently speak of consumption, but the reasoning is transferable to carbon use in production.  
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emissions level of a K-rational agent as the highest emissions level that does not result in any 
contradiction. We postulate the following maxim, 1M : 
1M : “As a K-rational agent, I shall consume at level ic , generating emissions flow )( ii ce  
to the atmosphere.”  
Then follows the categorical imperative turning this maxim into its universal law, UM1 :  
UM1 : “Every agent shall consume at level ic , generating emissions flow )( ii ce  to the 
atmosphere.”  
It is evident that there would be an emissions limit value (ELV) level )ˆ(ˆ ii ce  corresponding to a 
consumption level icˆ , which leads to a contradiction in conception, and the Kantian test fails. 
This arises when the aggregate emissions level reaches the Kantian emissions limit value cEˆ ,      
 )ˆ(ˆˆ
1
∑
=
≡
n
i
iic ceE        (1) 
where the assimilate capacity of the atmosphere, as a sink for emissions, is exceeded. A system 
where everyone exceeds )ˆ(ˆ ii ce  would, in Kantian terms, make the very concept of using the 
atmosphere as a sink for one’s emissions logically impossible, and consequently, describes a 
morally impermissible act. Again it would not be the irreversible damages or the loss of utility 
from climate destabilization per se that causes the test to fail, according to Kant, but the 
contradiction in conceptions.6  
                                                          
6 According to Kant ([1785] 1997), universalizing a maxim leads to its being valid to one of two contradictions: a 
contradiction in conception (where the maxim, when universalized, is no longer a viable means to the end) or a 
contradiction in will (where the will of a person contradicts what the universalization of the maxim implies). Our 
example above exemplifies the contradiction in conception. An example of contradiction in will would be when 
everyone consumes and emits the same emissions levels ei(ci) large enough such that the aggregated emissions level 
Ew prevents at least one other individual from consuming that same level of consumption ci . This would not be a 
logical contradiction in concept since one person not being able to consume my level due to climate destabilization 
does not make my concept of consuming and emitting logically impossible. However, according to Kant it would be 
a contradiction in will to want to consume the level ci in a universalized maxim implying that another individual will 
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If )( ii ce )ˆ(ˆ ii ce≥ , maxim 1M prescribes an intention to choose a consumption level, and 
generate emissions, leading to a contradiction in concept such that maxim 1M  cannot be 
universalized in 
UM1 . Hence, a chosen consumption level can be universalized only if 
)( ii ce )ˆ(ˆ ii ce< . Since 1M  self-defects and cannot be universalized without contradiction when 
)( ii ce )ˆ(ˆ ii ce≥ , the negation ( 1M¬ ) is a duty to act on. In other words, maintaining 
)( ii ce )ˆ(ˆ ii ce<  is a duty for the agent making it immoral for a K-rational agent choosing a 
consumption level corresponding to an emissions level )( ii ce )ˆ(ˆ ii ce≥ .7 The self-defection of 
1M  then concludes with this proposition: 
Proposition 1: It is a duty for a K-rational agent to not exceed the Kantian ELV per capita, 
hence )( ii ce )ˆ(ˆ ii ce<  .  
The duty implies that the Kantian ELV emissions per capita are equal for agents but would not 
imply that consumption levels are so. 
The Kantian test provides a fundamental ethical principle for how to set the endogenous Kantian 
ELV that is independent of the agent’s personal preferences or norms. With the same scope, the 
answer will be the same regardless of who performs the test. Although, science per se cannot 
produce such a normative principle, it can be used to empirically quantify cEˆ given this principle. 
A scientific estimation of cEˆ  may correspond to larger emissions levels than zero, and levels that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not be able to consume the same level because of climate destabilization. According to Kant, maxims that violate 
contradictions in conception are morally impermissible and lead to a “perfect duty” to not do, while maxims 
violating contradictions in will, lead to an “imperfect duty” to not do. The former dominates the latter. 
Contradictions in conception and contradictions in will, would not necessarily lead to duties on the same emissions 
levels. In the context of climate change we would not necessary expect that Ew and Ec would be equal. In our 
analysis we choose to use an example containing a contradiction in conception.       
7 Another example where this contradiction is easily seen is overfishing. A test of overfishing fails since the concept 
of overfishing, when universalized, contradicts the concept of fishing. Again, it is not the bad consequences of an 
extinct fish stock, but the contradiction in conceptions, that causes the test to fail. 
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could have some impact on the climate only as long as it is within the assimilative capacity of the 
atmosphere.  
 
2.2 Applying Kantian Ethics to CO2 Emissions Trading 
We now turn to deriving the moral constraints for Kantian agents in carbon markets where 
carbon allowances are traded.8 Critics have claimed that buying carbon allowances is immoral 
because it allows one to pay others to deal with the problem rather than change one’s own 
behavior (for overviews, see, e.g., Aldred 2012; Caney and Hepburn 2011). However, we find 
that Kantian agents should engage in emissions trading, since it is a duty to do so whenever their 
emissions exceed the Kantian ELV.  
In this section we choose to analyze a voluntary carbon market as the lack of a mandatory cap 
simplifies the analysis. However, the results in this section also convey to a compliance market 
as we will see in section 2.3. We use the same framework as in section 2.1 and ask whether it 
would be morally impermissible for Kantian agents to exceed the Kantian ELV such that 
)( ii ce )ˆ(ˆ ii ce≥ , provided that the agent engages in emissions trading that compensates the excess 
)( ii ce 0)ˆ(ˆ ≥− ii ce .  
Proposition 2: It is a permissible act and a duty for a K-rational agent to engage in emissions 
trading to compensate any emissions )( iii cez ≡ 0)ˆ(ˆ >− ii ce that exceed the Kantian ELV )ˆ(ˆ ii ce . 
Proof: We first define allowances that are traded by a Kantian agent as Kantian allowances.  
                                                          
8 The term allowances hereafter refers to credits and permits bought and sold on both compliance and voluntary 
markets. 
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Define first the maxim 2M : “I shall exceed the Kantian emissions limit, )ˆ(ˆ ii ce , by any amount 
iz  > 0.” Secondly, define the maxim C: “I shall buy iz  > 0 units of Kantian allowances,” and 
consider for the first test the maxim 3M , which omits buying, as follows: 
23 MCM ∧¬↔         (2) 
That is, 3M  says, “I shall not buy iz  > 0 units of Kantian allowances and exceed the 
Kantian emissions limit, )ˆ(ˆ ii ce , by any amount iz  > 0.” Acting on 2M  and not C is 
identical to acting on 2M , whatever the act is in the omitted maxim C. Hence 3M  is 
identical to 2M  and must share the same contradiction as 2M  and is impermissible 
according to proposition 1 in a test I. Since 3M  fails the test I for the same reason as 2M , 
then 3M¬  must be a duty that must pass a test II. First we derive the maxim 3M¬  to 
identify what are the properties of the duty, and then we perform test II on it. The duty is 
the negation of expression (2):  
)( 23 MCM ∧¬¬↔¬         (3) 
Using De Morgan’s Law yields 
( ) )( 223 MCMCM ¬∨¬¬¬¬⇔∧¬¬↔¬      (4) 
Applying the rule of double negation on the right-hand side identifies the duty: 
23 MCM ¬∨↔¬         (5) 
Translating the conditionals in (5) into words gives the duty 3M¬ : “I shall buy iz  > 0 units 
of Kantian allowances or shall not exceed the Kantian emissions limit, )ˆ(ˆ ii ce , by any 
amount iz  > 0.” Finally, perform test II. Universalizing 3M¬ gives 
UM 3¬ : “Everyone shall 
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either buy iz  > 0 units of Kantian allowances or shall not exceed the Kantian limit, )ˆ(ˆ ii ce , 
by any amount iz  > 0.”  
The disjunction on the right-hand side in (5) is an inclusive disjunction that allows one or 
the other or both to be valid, which gives three possibilities: (i) Maxim 2M¬ is invalid and 
C is valid. Emissions exceed )ˆ(ˆ ii ce  by the amount iz , and there is purchase of iz  units of 
Kantian allowances. (ii) Maxim 2M¬ is valid and C is invalid. Emissions do not exceed 
)ˆ(ˆ ii ce , and there is no purchase of Kantian allowances. (iii) Maxim 2M¬ is valid and C is 
valid. Emissions do not exceed )ˆ(ˆ ii ce , and there is purchase of iz  units of Kantian 
allowances.  
There is no contradiction in that everyone “either buys iz  units of Kantian 
allowances or does not exceed )ˆ(ˆ ii ce ,” as the disjunction (5) allows for any of the three 
cases (i)–(iii). Thus no contradiction would result as if only (i) had been the derived duty. 
Consequently, 3M¬  does not fail and is a duty to act on. Q.E.D.   
Thus in a system where every agent buys carbon allowances to compensate for his or her 
emissions above the Kantian ELV, the intention of compensating their own emissions by buying 
carbon allowances becomes impossible in Kantian terms, since the concept of allowances is no 
longer a viable means to the ends. Merely buying carbon allowances is not sufficient for making 
one´s emissions above the Kantian ELV morally permissible.  
Proposition 3: If no Kantian allowances, iz , are available on the market, the duty to engage in 
emissions trading to compensate any emissions, )( iii cez ≡  0)ˆ(ˆ >− ii ce , in proposition 2 is not 
satisfied, and there is instead a duty for a K-rational agent to not exceed the Kantian ELV per 
capita )ˆ(ˆ ii ce  following proposition 1. 
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Proof: Follows directly from (5); that is, 33),( MCMC ¬⇒¬¬∨ . Q.E.D.  
Universalizing the duty 3M¬ implies that everybody must either buy iz  > 0 allowances or not 
exceed the emissions limit )ˆ(ˆ ii ce  by any amount iz > 0. This can be universalized only if any 
allowances bought are traded for emissions not yet emitted below the emissions limit, )ˆ(ˆ ii ce . In 
other words, the duties in proposition 2 mimic trade on a hypothetical compliance market with 
the cap Eˆ  and the initial allocations )ˆ(ˆ ii ce  for all agents ni ,,3,2,1 K= .  
Proposition 4: K-rational agents mimic transactions on a cap-and-trade market with a cap 
equal to Eˆ  and initial allocations )ˆ(ˆ ii ce .  
Another way to express the result is to say that the allowances of an agent whose emissions 
exceed the Kantian ELV have been depleted, since the allowances originate from a reduction 
counted from the agent’s emissions level that is already in excess of the Kantian ELV both 
before and after the trade took place. By demanding such allowances as compensation for excess 
emissions, a buyer violates his duty in proposition 3.  
 
2.3 Emissions Trade Subject to Kantian Preferences  
In this section, we analyze a carbon market equilibrium when two types of traders, Kantian firms 
and regular firms, simultaneously engage in trade in a compliance market with a mandatory cap, 
PQ . Both types of firms maximize profit by producing and selling final goods. While regular 
consumers of final goods, Rq , optimize in accordance with standard economic theory and 
without any constraints, Kantian consumers optimize given that the Kantian categorical 
imperative is fulfilled with the duties in propositions 1–4. Kantian consumers will buy goods, 
Kq , only from firms that verify that they engage in Kantian trade on the carbon market. We call 
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such firms Kantian firms to distinguish them from regular firms. We assume that the 
representative regular firm maximizes the profit function  
( )RRRR eeP
qkaq −+−= 0
2
2
π       (6) 
where 0≥Rq  is a final good and 0>a  is the price on the final goods market and 0>k  is a 
production cost parameter. Production generates emissions and the firm participates in a cap-
and-trade market with allowance price, 0>P , choosing its output, Rq , while taking its initial 
emissions, 00 >e , as given. To simplify, we assume a one-to-one relationship between output 
and emissions, RR qe = , and maximize the profit function (6) with respect to Re . The first order 
condition is then  
0=−−=
∂
∂ Pkea
e RR
Rπ       (7) 
Rewriting the first order condition (7) yields 
RkeaP −=         (8) 
as the representative regular firm’s inverse `demand for emissions´ derived from the marginal 
revenue, a , that it receives from selling the final goods minus the marginal cost of production.  
We assume that a segment of consumers on a final goods market exhibit Kantian preferences 
such that they are willing to pay, aak γ= , for final goods, Kq , where 1≥γ and 0>Kq , produced 
by Kantian firms that verify that they follow Kantian trade according to proposition 1 to 3 on the 
cap-and-trade market with the cap PQ . We further assume that only a subset, PK QQ < , of this 
amount of allowances fulfills Kantian moral constraints in propositions 1 to 3. In other words, 
these allowances are supplied by sellers that can verify their emissions reductions below a level 
that is consistent with Kantian trade according to proposition 1 to 4 for the region. We denote 
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such allowances, K-allowances. Searching, identifying and verifying that an allowance belongs 
to the set of K-allowances, KQ , impose a transaction cost per allowance. To simplify, we express 
this transaction cost as a share of the final goods price, kaθ , where 10 ≤≤ θ . Again, using a one-
to-one relationship, KK qe = , between emissions and output we can now write the profit function 
of Kantian firms as:9 
( )KKKKKKK eePea
ekea −+−−= 0
2
2
θπ     (9) 
Kantian firms, maximizing profit, seek to verify that their emissions from production fulfills the 
Kantian trade principles on the carbon market against the voluntary cap, KQ , which is more 
stringent than the mandatory cap PQ . The first order condition of (9) with respect to Ke is then 
 0)1( =−−−=
∂
∂ Pkea
e KKK
K θ
π      (10) 
Finally, using that aaK γ=  we can write the inverse demand function of the representative 
Kantian firm as follows 
KkeaP −−= )1( θγ     0)1( ≥−θγ   (11) 
For simplicity, we assume that no technology shifts alter technologies behind the demand 
conditions and that there is perfect competition on all markets.  
Equations (8) and (11) represent the aggregate inverse demand functions of regular and Kantian 
firms, respectively, on the carbon market. Kantian firms, satisfying Kantian consumers’ 
preferences, by proposition 2 and 3, only demand K-allowances, Ke , from the subset, PK QQ < , 
while regular firms are indifferent, and arbitrage, between any type of allowances, Re  and Ke , 
                                                          
9 To simplify, we do not explicitly assume the existence of abatement technology that decouples output and 
emissions. Optimal adjustment in emissions and net revenues only occurs via adjustments in output.    
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while selling final goods to regular consumers. The demand functions in equations (8) and (11) 
after arbitrage, R∆ , then become 
R
k
PaPe RRR ∆−
−
=)(        (12)   
R
k
PaPe KKK ∆+
−−
=
)1()( θγ      (13) 
KQR ≤∆≤0         (14) 
where 0≥∆R is the arbitrage demand quantity by regular firms as they switch from demanding 
regular allowances to K-allowances whenever these are lower priced. That the quantity R∆ can 
take only nonnegative values in equation (14) is explained by the fact that Kantian firms do not 
demand regular allowances. Finally, R∆ is bound by the total number of K-allowances, KQ , in 
(14). Equilibrium on the market for regular allowances implies 
Kp
R QQR
k
Pa
−=∆−
−       (15)   
Equilibrium on the market for K-allowances implies 
K
K QR
k
Pa
=∆+
−− )1( θγ       (16) 
In summary, both regular and Kantian firms produce physically identical final goods, Rq and Kq , 
use identical technology and face identical costs of production.10 They trade allowances on the 
same cap-and-trade market. The difference is that Kantian firms profit from Kantian consumer’s 
willingness to pay extra for a more stringent carbon trade during production than what the 
mandatory cap offers or what can be verified at voluntary markets without a cap.     
                                                          
10 Without loss of generalization we here assume that firms have the same costs of production. The transaction costs 
needed to satisfy Kantian consumers will therefore be the only source of heterogeneity in costs.  
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Solving for equilibrium with arbitrage, using (14)–(16), results in five different sets of equilibria 
(see Appendix for proofs of results), denoted I–V in Table 3, depending on the Kantian demand 
parameter, γ , and transaction costs parameter, θ , which in turn determine how the aggregate 
demand by Kantian firms varies with respect to the aggregate demand of regular firms.  
 
Proposition 5: Under demand conditions in case I, aggregate demand of regular firms is 
sufficiently large with respect to aggregate demand of Kantian firms for emissions trade to result 
in the equilibrium price *0P  on a single market with only regular firms engaging in regular  
trade. Being perfect substitutes K-allowances and regular allowances become a homogenous 
good against the mandatory cap PQ . 
Proof: Appendix A1.  
This case identifies the set of equilibria in which the Kantian demand parameter,γ , takes a low 
value and/or the transaction cost parameter, θ , takes a high value. The aggregate demand of 
regular firms is sufficiently strong for them to buy all K-allowances and regular allowances. The 
optimal response by Kantian firms is to quit Kantian trade on the carbon market and become 
regular firms selling final goods to regular consumers. Hence, case I represents the regular cap-
and-trade market with all allowances as a homogeneous good.  
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Table 3. Carbon market conditions with various demand conditions and policy stringency 
Case Carbon market conditions Prices  Quantities Arbitrage Quantity 
Welfare effects 
from labelling 
allowances 
Demand conditions 
I 
Single carbon 
market with only 
regular trade 
*
0P  
0* =Ke  
PR Qe =
*  K
QR =∆  
 
 
0>∆W  
,0>∆ TCS
0>∆ TPS  
,0>∆ KCS
1
KPS∆  
,1RCS∆  
1
RPS∆  
 
 
PkQaa −=− )1( θγ  
( )KPK QQkakQa −−<−− )1( θγ  
II 
Dual carbon 
market with 
arbitrage 
*
0
** PPP RK ≥=  
KK QRe <∆−
*  
KPR QQRe −>∆+
*  
 
G
P Q
k
kQaaR +−−−=∆
2
)1( θγ
 P
kQaa −>− )1( θγ  
( )KPK QQkakQa −−<−− )1( θγ  
III 
Dual carbon 
market with no 
arbitrage 
*
0
** PPP RK >=  KK
Qe =*  
KPR QQe −=
*  
0=∆R  
0>∆W  
,0=∆ TCS
0>∆ TPS  
,0=∆ KCS  
0>∆ KPS  
,0=∆ RCS
0=∆ RPS  
PkQaa −>− )1( θγ  
( )KPK QQkakQa −−=−− )1( θγ  
IV 
Dual carbon 
market with no 
arbitrage 
 
*
0
** PPP RK >>  
 
KK Qe =
*  
KPR QQe −=
*  
0=∆R  
PkQaa −>− )1( θγ  
( )KPK QQkakQa −−>−− )1( θγ  
 
V 
Single market 
with only 
Kantian trade 
 
*
0
** PPP RK >>  
 
 
KK Qe =
*  
0* =Re  
0=∆R  
 
akQa K >−− )1( θγ  
 
Note: The cases I–V derive from a comparative static analysis, differentiating the carbon market equilibrium solution with respect to transaction costs θ  and policy stringency pQ in the last column, 
resulting in that the aggregate demand of regular firms being relatively large in cases I and II and the aggregate demand of Kantian firms being relatively large in cases IV and V. 
1 Ambiguous sign with the elasticity of demand on the carbon market as the conclusive determinant. 
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Proposition 6: Under demand conditions in case II, the aggregate demand of regular firms is 
sufficiently large with respect to aggregate demand of Kantian firms for emissions trade to result 
in equal equilibrium prices, *0
** PPP RK >= , for K-allowances and regular allowances, 
respectively, due to arbitrage, R∆ , by regular firms. Both Kantian and regular firms buy K-
allowances.   
Proof: Appendix A2.  
In this case the aggregate demand by Kantian consumers is sufficiently large, and/or the 
transactions costs for verifying Kantian trade are sufficiently low, for Kantian firms to begin 
buying K-allowances. Regular firms still arbitrage buying both K-allowances and regular 
allowances. K-allowances are initially priced lower than regular allowances, however, arbitrage 
by regular firms leads to equal prices of K-allowances and regular allowances which are larger 
than the single price, *0P , in case I due to the larger demand for K-allowances.   
Proposition 7: Under demand conditions in case III, equilibrium prices, *KP  and 
*
RP , of K-
allowances and regular allowances, respectively, are equal from the beginning on a dual market 
with no arbitrage by regular firms. Both prices are larger than the single price, *0P , in case I 
when only regular firms engage in trade. Hence prices are ordered as *0
** PPP RK >= .  
Proof: Appendix A3.  
This case identifies the special case when equilibrium prices are equal from the beginning on a 
dual market before any arbitrage take place by regular firms. Both prices, *KP  and 
*
RP , are larger 
than the single market price, *0P  in case I as the demand of Kantian firms also drives up the price 
of regular allowances, *RP , to be higher than the single price 
*
0P in case I where all firms on the 
carbon market are regular firms.  
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Proposition 8: Under demand conditions in case IV, the aggregate demand of Kantian firms is 
sufficiently large, in comparison with the aggregate demand of regular firms, to thwart any 
arbitrage by regular firms. The cap-and-trade market splits with dual equilibrium prices at 
different level, *0
** PPP RK >> .  
Proof: Appendix A4.  
As the demand parameter,γ , takes an ever higher value and/or the transaction cost parameter, θ , 
takes an even lower value, Kantian firms begin to signal their ambition to final consumers by 
engaging in Kantian trade at a higher price, *KP . Regular firms still trade under a lower carbon 
price against the less stringent mandatory policy cap PQ .  
Proposition 9: Under demand conditions in case V, the aggregate demand of Kantian firms is 
sufficiently large to prevent any arbitrage by regular firms while the policy stringency has 
reached the same level as the number of K-allowances such that 0=− KP QQ . Only Kantian 
firms remains on a single carbon market with a single price *0
** PPP RK >>  
Proof: Appendix A5.  
Toward the end of all trading periods, when PK QQ = , trade only in K-allowances remains. The 
regular allowances have vanished, and the market has become a single market with a single 
price, this time satisfying Kantian trade.   
The five cases I-V presents a continuum spanning five sets of market equilibria, each with 
distinct properties, depending on the Kantian demand parameter, γ , and the transaction costs 
parameter, θ . The equilibria of cap-and-trade markets seen in climate policy today correspond to 
case I where allowances are a homogeneous good traded at a single price. The cases II-IV are 
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dual markets where private incentives have found a way to differentiate trade among firms with 
different ambition level, and so capitalize a larger willingness to pay for this higher ambition.     
 
2.3.1 Welfare and distributional effects of introducing labelled allowances 
Both the demand parameter, γ , and the transaction cost parameter, θ , are conclusive for which 
set of equilibria that will prevail on the carbon market. A high value on γ , representing a larger 
demand of consumers with Kantian preferences, tends to push the equilibrium away from the 
cases I and II towards a dual market and dual prices. A high value on θ  tends to push the 
equilibrium away from case III and IV towards a less efficient dual carbon market with arbitrage 
or a single market where the carbon market only consists of regular firms.  
We now assume that the operating authority of the trading scheme creates a registry that labels 
the subset, KQ , of the total number of allowances with a “K”, so they fulfill the principles of 
“Kantian trade” in propositions 1 to 4. The substance behind this labelling is that the total 
number of allowances labelled “K” satisfies the Kantian KQ  as a voluntary cap below the 
mandatory cap PQ  of the compliance scheme. The administrative measures taken by the trading 
authority merely involve introducing the labelling of “K” for the subset, KQ , of allowances and 
keep track of these allowances in the registry and the transaction log of the trading scheme.11  
Once allowances are labelled and its number consistent with the Kantian KQ  limit of the region, 
proposition 4 applies, implying that Kantian agents, do not any longer need to bother about how 
the K-labelled allowances are allocated or who owns them. From a Kantian perspective, sellers 
and buyers of K-allowances can then be any firm. Hence, disclosing the K-allowances by 
                                                          
11 The analogy with third-degree price discrimination, where a seller exploits differences in elasticities among 
groups by setting different prices for identical goods across buyer groups, may seem evident, but the analogy is in 
fact not complete. The introduction of K-labelled allowances is an information disclosure, as K-labelled allowances 
have substantially different attributes to Kantian agents when it comes to trade procedures. 
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labelling them, eliminates the transaction cost, θ , of searching, identifying and verifying K-
allowances.  
Proposition 10: Under all demand conditions defined in cases I–V, the total welfare W always 
increases from introducing K-labelled allowances that decreases θ . In the cases I and II the 
total welfare increase is due to that both the total consumer surplus and the total producer 
surplus increases on the carbon market. The consumer surplus of Kantian firms always increases 
while the effects on the consumer surplus of regular firms and the producer surplus of sellers of 
allowances are ambiguous with the relative elasticities of demand on the carbon market as the 
conclusive determinants. In the cases III-V the increase in total welfare is due to the increase in 
producer surplus of sellers of K-labelled increases while there is no effect on the producer 
surplus of regular allowances and the consumer surplus of any firms. 
Proof: Appendix A6. 
 
2.3.2 Effects of the cap on the prices of allowances 
The successive reductions in each trading period of the mandatory cap, PQ , will affect the 
relationship between PQ  and the constant cap, KQ . In early trading periods one can expect, PQ , 
to be significantly larger than KQ , the latter in principle serving as a future prediction for PQ . 
The relative change in scarcity between K-labelled and regular allowances taking place during 
several trading periods may move the market equilibrium across the sets of equilibria with 
different properties in cases I-V. In principle, two alternative scenarios may occur depending on 
the relative demand conditions. In both cases trade will only occur with labelled allowances 
since all regular allowances have vanished when, PK QQ = . In the first scenario, regular firms 
have relatively large demand for allowances. As the policy cap is becoming more stringent, the 
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relative price of regular allowances increases, which increases arbitrage, and PK QQ =  
establishes in case I or II, with arbitrage and trade by only regular firms or by both types of 
firms. In the alternative scenario, Kantian firms have a relatively large demand. The price of 
regular allowances never catches up with the price of labelled allowances preventing arbitrage. 
Finally PK QQ =  establishes with equilibrium in case V and trade only with labelled allowances 
by Kantian firms. 
While the price of regular allowances tends to increase as a result of increased scarcity when the 
policy cap is becoming more stringent, the price of labelled allowances will not always do so. 
Under demand conditions in cases III–V, the price, *KP , of labelled allowances is not influenced 
by changes in the policy cap, PQ . This is evident from equation (A.17) in appendix A4 showing 
that KK kQaP −−= )1(
* θγ  is independent of PQ . That labelled allowances are subject to lower 
political risk than unlabelled allowances in dual markets without arbitrage may result in 
relatively lower price volatility and that the price of labelled allowances will contain an 
insurance premium that the price of unlabelled allowances will not contain in these equilibria.  
 
3. Results and Discussion 
The policy literature and the increasing use of carbon emissions trading schemes in climate 
policy suggest that carbon markets are one of the most important mechanisms in climate policy. 
Until today, the economic literature has assumed that regions within an emissions trading scheme 
agree on the most essential aspect which is the cap. However, in reality we see that regions in for 
instance EU ETS have different opinions on the stringency of the cap. This has generated a 
discussion to what extent countries or regions that want to take leadership within in a trading 
regime should implement additional national policy instruments that may counteract the 
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efficiency of the emissions trading scheme. In this paper we studied a carbon market where two 
segments of consumers, or regions, belonging to an emissions trading regime, have different 
ambitions about the stringency of the cap. We introduced a segment of final consumers with 
Kantian preferences implying that they prefer a more stringent cap consistent with emissions 
levels that will not lead to climate stabilization. In cap-and-trade markets with a cap not 
consistent with such emission levels, Kantian firms should instead search for allowances from 
sellers whose emissions reductions can be verified as being below such emissions levels, In 
existing carbon markets this would impose transaction costs. We then analyzed the disclosing of 
the K-allowances by labelling a subset of allowances matching the Kantian emissions limit of the 
regions that belong to the trading scheme. The number of labelled allowances then serve as a 
voluntary cap capturing the higher willingness to pay, and trade against a more stringent cap, by 
certain agents. We showed that arbitrage always prevents labelled allowances from being priced 
lower than regular allowances. Labelling could be introduced by trading schemes based on the 
emissions per capita from the regions of the trading scheme using the Kantian approach as 
guidance. Since labelling involves simply maintaining the label on a subset of allowances in the 
electronic registry, the additional administrative costs of labelling allowances should be low. 
We find that the total welfare always increases by introducing labelled allowances as long as a 
segment of final consumers that have Kantian preferences exist. In a single market equilibrium 
with only regular firms, and a dual market equilibrium where regular firms arbitrage between 
labelled and unlabelled allowances, both the total consumer surplus and the total producer 
surplus increases from labelling. Specifically, the consumer surplus of Kantian firms increases 
while the effects on the consumer surplus of regular firms and the producer surplus of sellers of 
labelled and regular allowances are ambiguous depending on the relative elasticities of demand. 
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In the cases with dual carbon markets without arbitrage, the increase in total welfare remains but 
now due to an increase in the producer surplus of sellers of labelled allowances.. 
The allocation of labelled allowances can also be used for achieving distributional objectives. 
When labelled allowances, consistently capping the Kantian limit of a region are introduced, 
proposition 4 applies, implying that the allocation of labelled allowances no longer matters for 
Kantian agents as it does on markets without labelling. Labelled allowances can therefore be 
either auctioned or freely allocated according to an allocation rule that is free of choice by 
policymakers without violating the “Kantian trade” principles in propositions 1-3. One possible 
allocation rule, for instance, would be that policymakers adopt a Kantian approach for the 
allocation in an international cap-and-trade scheme where labelled allowances are allocated to 
regions or countries having emissions per capita below the Kantian limit. This would usually be 
developing countries which then would receive the producer surplus of labelled allowances.  
After all, labelled allowances would likely be most efficient in large international trading 
schemes with a large amount of actors leaving a large amount of actors also for each market in 
dual equilibrium. Labelled allowances could be auctioned, where arbitrage always prevents that 
they would be lower priced than regular allowances, or freely allocated. Allocation rules could 
then take into account different income levels, emissions per capita as well as needs or other 
fairness and equity principles. More importantly, since trade in labelled allowances is voluntary, 
against a voluntary cap and a mandatory cap, the system is consistent with a bottom up approach 
where the efforts are built up gradually driven by actors and regions that wants to take 
leadership. 
Our analysis used a simple analytically tractable model exploring the comparative statics of the 
sets of equilibria of markets with labelled and unlabelled allowances. Still, we leave several 
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aspects for future research. Heterogeneous production and abatement costs would allow for 
deeper studies of the distributional effects among agents with different ambition levels in trading 
schemes. Study of imperfect markets would explore the strategic incentives. Dynamic analysis  
would be able to trace movements of equilibria for labelled and unlabelled allowances due to for 
instance technology adoption, increased scarcity from a tightening cap as well as the effects of 
political risk and differences in insurance premiums contained in dual pricing of labelled and 
unlabelled allowances.  
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Appendix A1 
Proof of proposition 5. 
Case I 
In this case ** RK PP <  holds, which is the demand condition in case I in table 3 
)()1( KPK QQkakQa −−<−−θγ ,     (A.1) 
together with the second demand condition in case I in table 3 
PkQaa −=− )1( θγ        (A.2) 
Using equilibrium conditions in (15) and (16) together with (A.1) yields that arbitrage, R∆ , by 
regular firms will continue with until equilibrium is reached when ** KR PP = . At most this can go 
on until KQR =∆  implying that regular firms buy all K-allowances. Using this in analogy with 
equations (A.6) – (A.8) we obtain the arbitrage quantity 
K
P
K Qk
kQaaQR =−−−+=∆
 2
)1( θγ      (A.3) 
Rearranging yields 
PkQaa −=− )1( θγ        (A.4) 
which is the demand condition defining case I in table 3. Using the demand function (8) of 
regular firms and the equilibrium condition, PR Qe = , yield the single equilibrium price in case I 
PkQaP −=
*
0         (A.5) 
with arbitrage until the equilibrium price PkQaP −=
*
0  is established. It is easily seen that 
whenever (A.2) holds, (A.1) also holds. Q.E.D 
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Appendix A2 
Proof of proposition 6. 
Case II 
In this case ** RK PP <  holds initially, which yields the demand condition in table 3 
)()1( KPK QQkakQa −−<−−θγ      (A.6) 
and arbitrage, 0>∆R , by regular firms. Using equilibrium conditions in (15) and (16), arbitrage 
will continue with until equilibrium is reached at ** KR PP = . Using this and rearranging the 
equilibrium conditions in (15) and (16) yield 
)()()1( RQQkaRQka KPK ∆+−−=∆−−−θγ     (A.7) 
Solving for R∆ gives the arbitrage quantity by regular firms 
0
2
)1(
>
−−−
+=∆
k
kQaaQR PK
θγ      (A.8) 
Substituting (A.8) into the equilibrium conditions (15) and (16) 
)()1(* RQkaP KK ∆−−−= θγ  
)(* RQQkaP KPR ∆+−−=  
and rearranging yields the equilibrium prices *RP  and 
*
KP  respectively:  
2
)1(* P
K
kQaaP −−+= θγ       (A.9) 
2
)1(* P
R
kQaaP −−+= θγ       (A.10)  
From (A.9) and (A.10) follows that ** RK PP = .  
We now prove that *0
** PPP RK >= . Using (A.10) and (A.5) we get that 
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P
P kQakQaa −>−−+
2
)1( θγ .      (A.11) 
which establishes *0
* PPR > . Q.E.D.  
Rearranging (A.11) also yields the first demand condition defining case II in table 3  
 PkQaa −>− )1( θγ        (A.12) 
 
Appendix A3 
Proof of proposition 7. 
Case III 
In this case ** RK PP =  holds from the beginning due to demand conditions in table 3  
)()1( KPK QQkakQa −−=−−θγ      (A.13) 
and thus there is no arbitrage 0=∆R . Too verify this, rearrange (A.13) which yields 
0
2
)1(
=
−−−
+
k
kQcpaQ PK
α       (A.14) 
Prove that *0
* PPR > . Using (A.13) and (A.5) we should prove that 
PKP kQaQQka −>−− )( .       (A.15) 
which is true since .0>KQ  
Note that in case II, ** GK PP <  initially holds until arbitrage, 0>∆R , results in 
**
RK PP =  while in 
the case III, ** RK PP = , immediately occurred in the equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
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Appendix A4 
Proof of proposition 8. 
Case IV 
In this case ** RK PP >  holds, which is the demand condition in case IV in table 3 
)()1( KPK QQkakQa −−>−−θγ      (A.16) 
for which there is no arbitrage by Kantian firms following proposition 3. A dual carbon market 
then emerges with dual equilibrium prices 
KK kQaP −−= )1(
* θγ         (A.17) 
)(* KPR QQkaP −−=        (A.18) 
We then prove that the inequality *0
** PPP RK >>  holds under these circumstances. The inequality 
**
RK PP >  is established directly by the demand condition (A.16). From (A.5) follows that 
PkQaP −=
*
0  and from (A.18) that )(
*
KPR QQkaP −−= . Hence we should prove 
that PKP kQaQQka −>−− )( , which is true since, .0>KQ  Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix A5 
Proof of proposition 9. 
Case V 
In this case ** RK PP > , which establishes the demand condition in table 3 for case V 
)()1( KPK QQkakQa −−>−−θγ       (A.19) 
when  
0=− KP QQ          (A.20) 
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Substituting (A.20) in (A.19) yields  
akQaP KK >−−= )1(
* θγ       (A.21) 
which implies that there are only Kantian firms engaged in trade on the market when 
0=− KP QQ  in case V. The prices are established at different price levels 
*
0
** PPP RK >> . First, 
**
RK PP > is established directly by the demand condition (A.21). Second, 
*
0
* PPR >  is shown by 
using )(* KPR QQkaP −−=  in (A.18) together with (A.5) and (A.20) to prove that 
PKP kQaQQka −>−− )( , which is true since .0>PQ  Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix A6 
Proof of proposition 10. 
Derivation of welfare levels.  
Case I 
Only regular firms demand allowances under demand condition PkQaca −<− )1(γ  in table 3  
Consumer surplus of regular firms is derived by using equation (A.5) and equilibrium condition 
PR Qe = . 
( ) ( ) 0
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2
*
0
*
0 ≥=
−
= PRR
kQPePaCS      (A.22) 
Producer surplus of sellers of regular allowances is derived by using (A.5) and equilibrium 
condition PR Qe = . 
( ) ( ) 02*0*0 ≥−=−== PPPPRR kQaQQkQaPePPS    (A.23) 
Consumer surplus of Kantian firms is derived by using equations (11) and (A.5) together with 
equilibrium condition 0=Ke . 
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( ) ( ) 0
2
)1( *
0
*
0 =
−−
= PePaCS KK
θγ       (A.24) 
since ( ) 0*0 =PeK  when PkQaa −=− )1( θγ  from equation (A.4) 
Producer surplus of sellers of Kantian allowances is derived by using (A.5) and equilibrium 
condition 0=Ke . 
( ) 0*0* == PePPS KKK        (A.25) 
since ( ) 0*0 =PeK  when demand condition PkQaa −=− )1( θγ  holds in case I. Q.E.D. 
 
Case II 
Consumer surplus of regular firms is found by substituting (A.10) in the expression for consumer 
surplus and using the quantity ReR ∆+ : 
( )( ) 0
2
*
≥∆+
−
= RePaCS RRR  
Rearranging yields  
( )( ) 0)1()1(
4
1
≥−−−−−−= KPR kQaakQaak
CS θγθγ   (A.26) 
Producer surplus of sellers of regular allowances is found by substituting (A.10) in the 
expression for producer surplus and using the equilibrium quantity ReR ∆+ : 
( ) ( ) 0*** ≥∆+== RePPePPS RRRRRR      
( )( ) 0)1()1(
2
1
≥−−−−−+−= KPR kQaakQaak
PS θγθγ   (A.27) 
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Consumer surplus of Kantian firms is found by substituting (A.9) in the expression for consumer 
surplus and using the quantity ReK ∆− : 
( )( ) 0
2
)1( *
≥∆−
−−
= RePaCS KKK
θγ  
Rearranging yields  
( )( )KPPK kQkQaakQaak
CS −+−−+−−= )1()1(
4
1
θγθγ  (A.28) 
Producer surplus of Kantian firms is found by substituting (A.9) in the expression for producer 
surplus and using the equilibrium quantity ReK ∆− : 
( ) ( ) 0*** ≥∆−== RePPePPS KKKKKK      
( )( ) 0)1()1(
2
1
≥−+−−−−+= KPPK kQkQaakQaak
PS θγθγ  (A.29) 
 
Total welfare 
Total consumer surplus in cases I-II is defined as  
0≥+=− RKIII CSCSCS  
Substituting (A.26) and (A.28) yields 
( )( ) 02)1(2)1(
4
1
≥−+−−+−−=− KPPIII kQkQaakQaak
CS θγθγ  (A.30) 
Total producer surplus in case II is defined as  
0≥+=− RKIII PSPSPS  
Substituting (A.27) and (A.29) yields 
( ) 0)1(
2
1
≥−−+=− PPIII QkQaaPS θγ     (A.31) 
Total welfare in case II 
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0≥+=− IIIIIII PSCSW  
Substituting (A.30) and (A.31) yields 
( )( ) ( ) 0)1(
2
12)1(2)1(
4
1
≥−−++−+−−+−−=− PPKPPIII QkQaakQkQaakQacak
W θγθγγ  
(A.32) 
 
Case III-V 
Consumer surplus of regular firms is found by substituting (A.18) in the expression for consumer 
surplus and using the quantity KP QQ − : 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0
22
*
*
*
≥−
−
=
−
= KP
R
RR
R
R QQ
PaPePaCS   
which yields  
( ) 0
2
2
≥
−
= KPR
QQkCS        (A.33) 
Producer surplus of sellers of regular allowances is found by substituting (A.18) in the 
expression for producer surplus and using the equilibrium quantity: 
( ) ( ) 0*** ≥−== KPRRRRR QQPPePPS     
which yields  
( ) ( ) 02 ≥−−−= KPKPR QQkQQaPS      (A.34) 
Consumer surplus of Kantian firms is found by substituting (A.17) in the expression for 
consumer surplus and using the equilibrium quantity KQ : 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
2
)1(
2
)1( *** ≥−−=−−= KKKKKK Q
PaPePaCS θγθγ   
which yields  
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0
2
2
≥= KK
kQCS         (A.35) 
Producer surplus of Kantian firms is found by substituting (A.17) in the expression for producer 
surplus and using the equilibrium quantity KQ : 
( ) 0*** ≥== KKKKKK QPPePPS    
which yields   
0)1( 2 ≥−−= KKK kQQaPS θγ       (A.36) 
 
Total welfare 
Total consumer surplus in the cases III-V is defined as  
0≥+=− RKVIII CSCSCS  
Substituting  (A.33) and (A.35) yields 
( ) 0
22
22
≥
−
+=−
KPK
VIII
QQkkQCS       (A.37) 
Total producer surplus in case II is defined as  
0≥+=− RKVIII PSPSPS  
Substituting  (A.34) and (A.36) yields 
( ) ( ) 0)1( 22 ≥−−+−−−=− KKKPKPVIII kQQaQQkQQaPS θγ   (A.38) 
Total welfare in case II is defined as  
0≥+= −−− VIIIVIIIVIII PSCSW  
Substituting  (A.37) and (A.38) yields 
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( ) ( ) ( ) 0)1(
22
22
22
≥−−+−−−+
−
+=− KKKPKP
KPK
VIII kQQaQQkQQa
QQkkQW θγ  
(A.39) 
 
Welfare effects 
The welfare effects of reducing the transaction cost, θ , is analyzed the comparative statics of the 
market equilibrium.  
Cases I-II 
We start with the analysis of dual market in case II and then continue with case I. The change in 
consumer surplus of regular firms is derived by differentiating (A.26) with respect to θ . 
( ))(2)1(2
4 KP
R QQkaa
k
aCS
+−−−−=
∂
∂
θγ
γ
θ
   
and rearranging    





 −
+
−−−=
∂
∂ 1
2
)()1(
4 a
QQka
k
aCS KPR θγγ
θ
    (A.40) 
where the sign is ambiguous and depends on the ratio between a and k , the elasticity of demand 
on the carbon market.  
Change in producer surplus of sellers of regular allowances is derived by differentiating (A.27) 
with respect to θ . 
( ))()1(2
2 KP
R QQka
k
aPS
+−−=
∂
∂
θγ
γ
θ
    (A.41) 
where the sign is ambiguous and depends on the ratio between a and k , the elasticity of demand 
on the carbon market.  
Change in consumer surplus of Kantian firms is derived by differentiating (A.28) with respect to 
θ . 
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( )KPK kQkQaak
aCS
−+−−−=
∂
∂ 22)1(2
4
θγ
γ
θ
  
and rearranging    
01)2/()1(
4
≤




 −
−
+−−=
∂
∂
a
QQka
k
aCS KPK θγγ
θ
   (A.42) 
since 1)1( ≥−θγa . 
Change in producer surplus of sellers of Kantian allowances is derived by differentiating (A.29) 
with respect to θ . 
( )KK kQak
aPS
−−−=
∂
∂ )1(2
2
θγ
γ
θ
     (A.43) 
where the sign is ambiguous and depends on the ratio between a and k , the elasticity of demand 
on the carbon market.  
The change in total consumer surplus is obtained by using (A.40) and (A.42) which gives  
( ) 0234)1(4
4
≤−+−−−=
∂
∂ −
KP
III kQkQaa
k
aCS
θγ
γ
θ
  (A.44) 
since 1)1( ≥−θγa . 
Change in total producer surplus is obtained by using (A.40) and (A.43) which gives  
0
4
2
≤−=
∂
∂ −
P
III QaPS γ
θ
      (A.45) 
Change in total welfare IIIIII PSCSW −− +=  is defined as 
θθθ ∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ −−− IIIIIIIII PSCSW       (A.46) 
Using (A.44) and (A.45) gives 
( ) 0
4
2234)1(4
4
≤−−+−−−=
∂
∂ −
PKP
III kQ
k
akQkQaa
k
aW γ
θγ
γ
θ
 (A.47) 
since 1)1( ≥−θγa . 
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The demand conditions in case I is the equation PkQaa −=− )1( θγ  in equation (A.2). Given 
this, any reduction in the transactions cost parameter, θ , will produce the inequality 
PkQaa −>− )1( θγ  in (A.2), which is the demand condition of the dual market in case II. Hence, 
the results on welfare effects in case II also hold in case I.    
 
Case III-V 
Change in consumer surplus of regular firms is derived by differentiating (A.33) with respect to 
θ . 
0=
∂
∂
θ
RCS         (A.48) 
Change in producer surplus of sellers of regular allowances is derived by differentiating (A.34) 
with respect to θ . 
0=
∂
∂
θ
RPS         (A.49) 
Change in consumer surplus of Kantian firms is derived by differentiating (A.35) with respect to 
θ . 
0=
∂
∂
θ
KCS         (A.50) 
Change in producer surplus of sellers of Kantian allowances firms is derived by differentiating 
(A.36) with respect to θ . 
0<−=
∂
∂
K
K QaPS γ
θ
       (A.51) 
The change in total consumer surplus is obtained by using (A.48) and (A50) gives  
0=
∂
∂ −
θ
VIIICS         (A.52) 
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The change in total producer surplus is obtained by using (A.49) and (A51) gives  
0<−=
∂
∂ −
K
VIII QaPS γ
θ
      (A.53) 
The change in total welfare VIIIVIII PSCSW −− +=  is defined as 
θθθ ∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ −−− VIIIVIIIVIII PSCSW      (A.54) 
Using (A.52) and (A.53) in (A.54) yields 
yields 
0<−=
∂
∂
KQa
W
γ
θ
       (A.55)
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